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Volume ramp ups are notoriously difficult in digital services, where mar-
ket pressures can lead to ramping up too soon and too rapidly which in
turn can lead to the need to ramp down. This paper addresses the chal-
lenge of taking innovation to scale in an established firm by enhancing
our understanding of the nature of service ramp ups and ramp downs.
Digital service ramp ups differ substantially from production ramp ups as
the speed is much greater, and problems are visible to customers. How-
ever there are similarities between service ramp downs and product recalls
and an important contribution is exploring the nature of ramp downs
their processes and possible causes. Using an engaged research approach,
longitudinal data from three consecutive ramp ups in a European telecom
operator were collected. Through analyses of cases, qualitative and quanti-
tative case data, and using a system dynamics model, we identified a set
of issues that affect service ramp ups and ramp downs. These include the
need to ramp up the service supply chain, biases leading to unrealistic
assumptions about scalability and problem-solving, decision biases in var-
ious functions, launching digital services in beta form, a lack of trans-
parency of capacity and lack of learning from previous ramp ups. We
show that if these problems are not addressed or resolution is delayed,
this can lead to cycles of delay, backlogs and productivity problems and
the inevitability of a ramp down. We explore reasons and importance for
such delays that lead to service ramp downs.
Keywords: service supply chains; ramp ups; ramp downs; recalls; system dynamics;
clinical methods; engaged research
INTRODUCTION
Nobody has been as fast as we intend to be. (Ramp
up manager)
Markets are pressuring companies to develop new
services quickly and to get them to market as soon as
possible, leading to pressure for rapid deployment
and ramp ups. Such pressure has increased with the
growing digitalization of service sectors such as bank-
ing, insurance, and media (McKinsey & Co., 2015).
Ramp ups of such services usually require a significant
commitment of resources, which may cause problems
if the available resources do not match the demand
growth or if they are diverted from other services and
involve ramping up the whole service supply chain.
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One of the top five reasons for new product and ser-
vice failures is organizations failing to manage the ramp
up (Schneider & Hall, 2011). Problems during ramp up
can lead to difficulties in meeting time-to-market targets
and may negatively influence service outcomes. For
example, following an SAP rollout by an energy provi-
der in 2011, many of the company’s 5.4 million cus-
tomers experienced issues, such as billing delays as
account details were transferred to the SAP platform. A
resulting backlog of complaints created longer call-wait-
ing times. The UK energy regulator highlighted a seri-
ous deterioration in service levels (Finnegan, 2013),
prompting a public apology from the CEO. A public
sector example is the rollout of the US Affordable Care
Act (Obamacare). In 2013, former Secretary of Health
and Human Services, Kathleen Sebelius, said that the
administration’s original predictions about its timetable
were “flat-out wrong.” She remarked, “Could we have
used more time and testing? You bet” (Alter, 2014).
This created problems for both the potential users and
the government. Negative publicity around repeated
problems with new service and system ramp ups is not
uncommon, with numerous examples of rapid ramp
ups and a pattern of initial rapid rollouts followed by
ramp downs— a slowdown or complete halt.
There is extensive literature on the need for product
and service innovation, such as new service develop-
ment (NSD) and the processes involved (Menor, Tati-
konda & Sampson, 2002). However, this literature is
virtually silent on the challenge of taking innovation
to scale. In this paper, we focus on this challenge in
service firms, specifically in the context of digital ser-
vices. The effectiveness of ramp ups can be an impor-
tant factor in competitiveness. The competitive
advantage gained from knowledge-based assets, such
as new services, depends in part on exploiting them
effectively via rapid and effective ramp up and doing
so consistently better than one’s competitors. Thus, it
is important for managers in service organizations to
understand the issues, key decisions, and trade-offs
associated with ramp ups and how any problems can
be mitigated during the ramp up process. Equally, at a
theoretical level, we need to develop a better under-
standing of the nature of service ramp ups. Research
into digital service supply chains has shown how
unforeseen problems can lead to the phenomenon of
fallout (Akkermans & Vos, 2003). Scalability is an
important aspect of service ramp ups, both the nature
of the service and management assumptions affect it
(Boyer, Hallowell & Roth, 2001; Hallowell, 2001).
The research in this paper set out to explore ramp
ups in the context of digital services. As the research
progressed, we observed problematic ramp ups lead-
ing to ramp downs and extended the scope of the
research to address this. There is a growing body of
ramp up research in manufacturing (Heine, Beaujean
& Schmitt, 2016; Terweisch, Bohn & Chew, 2001)
and the supply chain (Li, Shia, Gregory & Tan, 2014).
We contend that the context of services, in particular
digital services, can differ substantially from products
during ramp ups. We put forward and explore three
areas of difference. First, service ramp ups take place
in the field, and as production and consumption are
simultaneous, they may manifest themselves directly
to the customer in setup or use. Second, in services,
especially digital services, ramp ups can be much stee-
per. Finally, there can be pressures to ramp up the ser-
vice before it is fully developed. In addition to
differences, there are commonalities between product
and service ramp ups, especially in that both require
ramping up the supply chain resources and capacities.
Ramp downs have not been studied, though product
recall, which has similar characteristics, is an area of
increasing concern to supply chain managers and
researchers (Wowak & Boone, 2015). The objective of
this paper is to explore ramp ups and ramp downs in
the context of digital services, which we address
through longitudinal field research in three digital ser-
vices in a medium-sized European telecom company.
This paper contributes to knowledge on the chal-
lenge of taking innovation to scale in an established
firm by enhancing our understanding of the nature of
service ramp ups, ramp downs, and associated issues.
A distinctive contribution of this research is identify-
ing the importance and the nature of the ramp down
stage and associated decisions and issues.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Service and Product Ramp ups
A service ramp up is the process of rapidly increas-
ing the delivery of a service to meet demand. The
terms “deployment,” “launch,” and “rollout” are fre-
quently used to describe the same activities. Existing
knowledge on ramp ups is primarily based on prod-
ucts, “the notion of ramp ups has never been used in
the case of services” (Lenfle & Midler, 2009, p. 158).
There are a range of factors that potentially affect pro-
duct ramp up success, including product complexity
and scope, project management, quality of the manu-
facturing process (Clark & Fujimoto, 1991), learning
prior to and during ramp up (Pisano, 1996), and run-
ning pilot production and full-scale ramp up in paral-
lel (Terweisch et al., 2001). The dynamic context of
ramp ups means that many decisions must be made
quickly. The ability to act is influenced by high levels
of multidisciplinarity, with decision makers from dif-
ferent fields such as production, logistics, or planning.
Their actions may interact, creating interdependencies
(R€ossler, 2016). This complexity of ramp ups can lead
to a low degree of transparency, complicating the
decision-making process (Brauner et al., 2016).
Volume 0, Number 0
Journal of Supply Chain Management
2
Design schedule slippage can cause ramp ups to be
accelerated to meet delivery targets, leading to huge
budget and schedule overruns, described as “train
wrecks” (Mass & Berkson, 1995). Moreover, the
increasing levels of automation in the service pro-
cesses of digital services give rise to the possibility of
“order fallout.” For example, quality problems often
occur in service supply chains, especially when they
are under pressure (Oliva & Sterman, 2001); if the
problem cannot be addressed by IT, it “falls out” and
requires manual intervention, sometimes called “re-
work” (Akkermans & Vos, 2003). Backlogs resulting
from fallout can lead to high workloads, more errors,
and more rework, triggering a vicious cycle of more
errors, rework, and work pressure. This can lead
to high uncertainty concerning future capacity
requirements.
Products and services are increasingly linked, both
conceptually and through design. An example is servi-
tization, where manufacturers develop the capabilities
needed to provide services that supplement their tradi-
tional product offerings (Baines, 2015). The extant
research on product ramp ups is relevant to services,
but the nature of services—especially digital services
during ramp up—may lead to differences from pro-
duct ramp ups. First, product ramp ups take place in
the factory, whereas service ramp ups take place in the
field. In services, problems during ramp up will not
only lead to delays, but as production and consump-
tion are simultaneous, problems may manifest directly
to the customer in setup or use. In contrast, many
problems that occur in product ramp ups may not be
visible to customers beyond delivery delays, and they
may allow problem-solving and learning to take place
prior to delivery to customers (Terweisch et al., 2001).
Another potential difference between products and
services is the speed of ramp up. As companies look
beyond time-to-market to time-to-volume, the speed
of ramp up has become increasingly important (Ter-
weisch et al., 2001). Although there are equal pres-
sures on products and services to get innovations to
market rapidly, in services, especially digital services,
where IT lead times can be extremely short, ramp ups
can be much steeper. The steeper the ramp up, the
less time there is to detect and react to problems
before they affect a large customer base.
An important antecedent of the ability to ramp up
rapidly is scalability: the ability of a system, network,
or process to handle a growing amount of work in a
capable manner or enlarged to accommodate that
growth. The scalability of the service itself is a mea-
sure of how it scales when deployed on larger and/or
more systems or as more load is applied. Boyer et al.
(2001) described a continuum from high to low scala-
bility in services. Services that are pure information
have high scalability, and commoditized and
standardized services exhibit higher scalability, while
more unique or awkward handling issues exhibit
lower scalability. Hallowell (2001) argued that scala-
bility is often neglected when firms seek to maximize
the growth of technologically intermediated services.
To achieve high scalability, firms seek to reduce their
dependence on human resources through automation.
This approach can have severe limitations, such as
when the physical components associated with the
service do not lend themselves to high scalability
(Boyer et al., 2001).
There are issues associated with overly rapid pro-
duct/service development. The “get big fast” strategy is
associated with the growth of the Internet and digital
business; it is widely accepted that getting big too fast
can be dangerous, and there are limits to growth
(Sterman, Henderson, Beinhocker & Newman, 2007).
Setting aggressive commercialization schedules often
has the opposite effect than intended, creating longer
delays and lower quality, with cascading effects on
product development projects (Mass & Berkson,
1995). Too rapid growth also contributes to the ero-
sion of service quality, for example, by hiring inexpe-
rienced employees. This leads to productivity fall-offs,
the diversion of experienced personnel to support this,
excessive workloads, and subsequent employee burn-
out and, ultimately, to even worse service quality.
Ramp ups must be managed throughout the supply
chain (Li et al., 2014). A service supply chain is
where service providers draw on the resources of
diverse subcontractors, including internal suppliers,
and integrate those resources into the production of
the service (Maull, Geraldi & Johnston, 2012; Samp-
son & Spring, 2012). Elements of service components
can also be delivered to the customer directly from
the subcontractor (Wynstra, Axelsson & van der Valk,
2006). Conceptualizations of service supply chains
stress the interconnected relationships among cus-
tomers, service providers, and their subcontractors
(Selviaridis & Norrman, 2014). The process of creat-
ing and defining value is not as straightforward since
multiple actors, including the customer, are involved
in service design, production, and delivery. When a
complex service is ramped up, there is an implicit
assumption that all components of the service,
including the upstream service supply chain, can be
ramped up at the same rate or already have the
capacity in place.
As service ramp ups typically take place at the end
of the NSD process, the nature and outcome of this
process may affect ramp up success. In services, this
development process commonly involves two phases:
alpha and beta. The objective of the alpha phase is to
improve the quality of the service and ensure that it is
ready for final development. Testing takes place when
the service is in a near-fully usable state and is
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normally performed by test engineers and “friendly
users.” Most known critical issues should be fixed at
this stage. The beta phase takes the nearly usable ser-
vice and develops it into a service that is ready for
release. Testing takes place in the “real world” with
real customers, and feedback can cover every element
of the service, typically involving the full service team,
including marketing, support, quality, and engineering
personnel. The beta phase is considered closed and
ready for launch when all major and minor issues
have been addressed. Commercial pressures to launch
early, combined with the difficulty of fully testing a
service before ramp up, can lead to a product or ser-
vice being released before it is fully developed. There
is evidence that it is increasingly common for services
to be launched before being fully tested –”launching
in beta” (Zomerdijk & Voss, 2011).
Although the phenomenon of service ramp downs
has not been studied, it may have similarities to pro-
duct recalls. There are growing numbers of recalls, par-
ticularly in products such as automotive and
pharmaceutical where defective products have the
potential to cause harm (Ball, Shah & Donohue, 2018;
Hora, Bapuji & Roth, 2011). Causes of the need to
recall can include design defects, manufacturing
defects, inadequate testing, or inadequate or mislead-
ing instructions for use (Hall & Johnson-Hall, 2017;
Hora et al., 2011). Of concern in product recalls is the
time taken to recall (Ni & Huang, 2017). The decision
to recall may be voluntary, initiated by the supplier, or
involuntary, required by a regulatory body. Product
recall costs, which can be considerable, are pressing
concerns for supply chain managers (Wowak & Boone,
2015). Hora et al. (2011) point out that in addition to
the societal costs of recalls, firms face their own exter-
nal failure costs, both direct and indirect, that arise
from product recalls. Direct costs include the costs of
managing the reverse flow of products, disposal costs,
restitution costs, and legal and liability costs due to
any litigation. Indirect costs, which in some instances
may be higher than direct costs, include loss of brand
image and erosion of market value.
Research Objectives
At the outset of this research, the objective was to
develop our understanding of service ramp ups. Ramp
ups remain a relatively understudied area; “while
researchers have studied product development pro-
cesses, relatively few studies directly address new pro-
duct launch” (Schoenherr & Swink, 2015, p. 901),
and extant research has focused on product but not
on service ramp ups. As the research progressed, we
observed problems during ramp up leading to major
ramp downs, which made us extend our objectives to
include developing understanding of the nature and
process of service ramp down. Given the paucity of
research into both service ramp ups and ramp downs,
to improve knowledge and understanding, especially
in the case of digital services, we needed to build on
extant research from products but recognize potential
differences. To do so, we needed to explore the ante-
cedent processes, dimensions, and outcomes of service
ramp ups and ramp downs. Areas highlighted by pre-
vious research include scalability, ramping up the sup-
ply chain, and managerial behavior with respect to
the speed of ramp up and timing of ramp down. The
above review suggests that the scope of study should
include both the antecedents and the supply network
of the services studied. As the ramp up and ramp
down processes extend over a period of time, a longi-
tudinal research process is appropriate.
METHOD
The research is based on a longitudinal study of
three cases embedded in a single company using an
engaged research process (Van de Ven, 2007). The
research was conducted at ETEL, a medium-sized
European telecommunications provider. This industry
involves frequent ramp ups of new services, which are
early in product life cycles, with increased demand for
on-time deliveries in shorter time frames and gener-
ally shorter lead times (Agrella, Lindroth & Andreas
Norrman, 2004, p. 2). These services are increasingly
digitally based, and thus, the industry is an appropri-
ate setting for this study. ETEL was chosen because
two of the authors were already conducting research
there.
For research in emergent areas and theory develop-
ment, inductive methods using a limited number of
cases are appropriate (Barratt, Choi & Li, 2011). A
longitudinal research design (Ahlstr€om & Karlsson,
2016) is appropriate for examining processes that
unfold over time. Taking the service ramp up as our
unit of analysis, we selected three consecutive cases of
ramp ups embedded in one company. When selecting
cases, it is also important to consider the parameters
that will be held constant across the sample (Voss,
Johnson & Godsell, 2016). The selected cases all had
similar organizational contexts, markets, technologies,
and market pressures for rapid ramp up.
Case 1 (2005–2007) entailed the launch of Con-
sumer Voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP). A key
objective was to provide superior services over its
existing infrastructure, keeping its market-leading cus-
tomer base intact. At the outset of the study, ETEL
was suffering at the hands of cable operators offering
higher speeds using new technology. Thus, ETEL
wanted to upgrade its old-fashioned copper infrastruc-
ture to fiber and sell the new service to as many peo-
ple as possible, which constitutes case 2 (2007–2009):
fiber-based broadband services. Following consumer
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VOIP, the company launched a business VOIP service
—case 3 (2010–2011). In all three cases, a key goal
was to roll out the new service as fast as possible,
either to preempt or react to the competition. Because
of their strategic importance, there were effectively no
budget constraints.
Data Collection1
In longitudinal studies, the main method of data
collection is participant observation, where the
researcher records actions as they occur in the research
setting. A clinical research process was used (Karlsson,
2016), supplemented by case research methods in
case 2. Clinical research is an established engaged
method in social sciences where the organization
invites the researcher to examine and contribute to
understanding and addressing an important problem
or set of problems. It typically involves a research
question that is of interest to both the researcher and
the organization (Karlsson, 2016; Schein, 1987). In
this study, the case company invited one of the co-
authors to study and address the problems associated
with the ramp up of a new service. Schein (1987)
argued that there are four possible modes for clinical
enquiry: pure enquiry, diagnostic enquiry, action-
oriented enquiry, and confrontive enquiry. This
research followed the diagnostic and action-oriented
enquiry modes. The purpose of diagnostic enquiry is
searching for causalities, and for action-oriented
enquiry, it is influencing the organization’s thought
process in regard to actions in the past, present, and
future (Karlsson, 2016, p. 281).
One researcher had a continuous relationship with
the organization and kept a logbook of all the interac-
tions with the company. In addition to the direct
interactions, the researcher had access to substantial
documentation and company databases. In case 1, as
part of developing an understanding of the causalities,
a system dynamics-type cause-and-effect model was
developed (Sterman, 2000), and four workshops were
held with a set of managers from the organization
and the associated supply chain to discuss the concep-
tual structure of the model. At the end of the first
case, the developed understandings and model were
discussed with the leadership of the ramp up process.
These led to action by the company in seeking to
improve their processes. Based on the learning from
case 1, the data needed to be collected for the second
case to enable understanding of the ramp up were
identified. The process the researcher used was
repeated for the second ramp up. The cause-and-effect
model was developed further to reflect the findings
from the second case. Again, a workshop was held
with company managers, which also led to improve-
ment action by the company. At the end, the research
and top management reflected on the experience, the
findings, and the learning for future ramp ups. A simi-
lar process was conducted for case 3.
Additional data in case 2 were collected by a second
author using case research rather than clinical
research. Twenty interviews were carried out with
company managers, with 13 conducted in case 2 and
seven after the ramp down in case 3. The model
developed in the previous case provided initial guide-
lines for the research. A simple protocol was used for
the interviews (e.g., “What went wrong? Why did it go
wrong?”). All the interviews were recorded in the local
language and transcribed, and their durations lasted
45–90 minutes in length.
Sources of data in longitudinal research should
include interviews and documents (Ahlstr€om & Karls-
son, 2016), yielding both qualitative and quantitative
data (Voss et al., 2016). Quantitative data on all three
ramp ups were collected from company records and
databases on sales, orders at various process stages,
rework rates, backlogs, and call and complaint rates
over the ramp up period. Qualitative data were gath-
ered from interviews, attendance at meetings, and
archival material. The researchers also had access to
the company’s intranet database. Analysis was based
on a combination of the clinical and case research
data. Management decisions were annotated using
archival meeting records and presentations (~700
archive records), and some 180 separate events were
distilled. For each case, a narrative or story of how the
sequence of events produced the outcome was con-
structed. Timelines were developed for each ramp up,
identifying key issues and decisions at points along
the timeline. The data were coded using the relational
database functionality of Excel. An iterative process
was followed to search for patterns, commonalities,
and differences across the cases, which were then
reviewed with the research team and company man-
agers for refining and further development. For cross-
case analysis, the timeline patterns and key themes
were compared across the three cases. This research
design provides strong situational grounding and
enhances the quality and depth of insights in emer-
gent areas, but it has limitations in terms of generaliz-
ability (Ketokivi & Choi, 2014).
To address reliability and validity, a range of people
involved in decision-making were interviewed, and
results were fed back to participants (Voss et al.,
2016). A senior manager responsible for large parts of
the services participated in discussions and reflections
on what had taken place in all three ramp ups. The
iterative collection of data from different sources pro-
vided multiple triangulation opportunities, enhancing
reliability and validity (Barratt et al., 2011).
1Further details of the data collection are available in our online
supplement.
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ANALYSIS
The qualitative data for the three ramp ups are
shown in Appendix and summarized in Table 1. In all
three, the supply chains were a combination of ser-
vice, IT, and physical elements. An overview of the
supply chain for case 1 is shown in Figure 1.
Cross-case analysis found that all three cases showed
similar patterns of ramp up behavior (see Figures 2–4)
—development followed by rapid ramp up and, after
problems developed, ramp down. For example, in case
1, once a sale had been made (contracted), installation
and activation were required before the customer can
use the service. When backlogs or post-installation
problems occurred, customers contacted the helpdesk,
who also registered complaints. While installation was
not delayed, as the supply chain was able to cope with
the growth in contracts, there were problems in using
the installed services, leading to an escalation in calls to
TABLE 1
Summary of In-case Analysis
Case 1: Consumer VOIP Case 2: Fiber broadband Case 3: Business VOIP
Alpha Phase
Alpha testing Test on small number of
customers
Limited number of friendly
users
Extended period of
testing with 100
friendly users
Orders taken
during alpha
phase
No orders taken Orders taken during phase No orders taken
Beta Phase
Orders taken
during beta
phase
Public launch and orders
taken, limited ramp up
already started
Increasing number of orders
taken. Pressure to increase
sales
Limited order intake
Beta testing Test on users Tested on large number of
users
Test on users
Problems during
phase
Technical problems with
service connectivity
Many technical problems
leading to lack of
activation, workarounds
Technical problems,
many addressed
through workarounds
Problems at end
of phase
Some intermittent service Many problems remaining Problems perceived as
solved
Backlog and
capacity issues
at end
No supply chain capacity
problems, some backlog
Significant backlog and
capacity issues
Almost no backlog
Ramp up
escalation
Rapid ramp up of sales
efforts
Rapid ramp up of orders Ambitious ramp up
Issues during
ramp up
More complex orders
added
Technical problems
Fulfillment capacity
shortage
Activations lag orders
Technical problems
Capacity problems
Backlog worsens
New problems emerge
Workarounds not
robust
Rapid backlog growth
Problems in part of
service not involved in
beta testing
Ramp down
Weeks from ramp
up to start of
ramp down
32 weeks 11 weeks 11 weeks
Triggered by Level of complaints
Negative media coverage
High backlog, quality
problems, and level of
complaints
Massive backlog
Order cancelations
Degree of ramp
down
Rapid slowing of order
intake
All order intake stopped 1/3 of orders canceled
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the contact center and, in turn, an escalation in com-
plaints. Figure 2 shows the data for the rapid growth of
contracted sales, growth of complaints pending, and
rapid growth of helpdesk call volume.
Activation lagging behind sales created a backlog
(cumulative orders contracted less orders activated).
This is illustrated by cases 2 and 3: Problems during
ramp up meant that, although orders were taken,
installation (and therefore activation) was delayed.
Figure 3 shows the resulting dramatic rise in backlog
in case 2. Figure 4 shows the same pattern for case 3
as well as the resulting order cancelations. One strik-
ing feature was the extent of the ramp down. In all
three cases, when the level of backlog and/or com-
plaints eventually became extremely high, the com-
pany had to stop, slow, or cancel order intake,
leading to ramp down.
We analyze the data across the three cases in two
phases, ramp up and ramp down. We then model the
dynamics of the interactions between marketing and
operations to gain further insights into the ramp up
and ramp down processes.
Ramp up
Alpha Phase. In this phase, the service was tested
with limited use. For example, in case 2, testing was
initially conducted internally and then with a number
of friendly users, followed by a first local pilot. In case
3, testing was extended to 100 friendly users. This
phase generated considerable feedback, which
informed problem-solving and refinement. In all three
cases, there were explicit strategies for restraining
growth, but there were actual initial sales in cases 1
and 2.
Beta Phase. In this phase, further development of
the service was ongoing, with a strong focus on prob-
lem-solving, learning, and resolving all problems so
that full ramp up could proceed. Sales began with real
rather than friendly customers to enable beta testing
of the service in the delivered mode. In cases 1 and 2,
the level of order intake, although low, was higher
than desired by the technical teams; problems with
delivery and use led to increased backlogs and nega-
tive customer feedback. No formal beta testing took
place before the decision was made to ramp up;
FIGURE 1
Case 1 Service Supply Chain [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Information flow
Physical flow
Note: 1) Either online/self-care, through a store or via phone
2) if required (for existing customers hardware may already be present)
3) by either the customer herself or a field engineer
Customer
orders 
service1
Order 
information
is processed
Network is 
configured
Customer 
data error 
checks Customer receives
hardware 
peripherals2
(Modem, TV unit, 
Phone)
Hardware is 
installed and 
configured2,3
Service(s) are
activated
Warehouse
ships hardware
In case of service change (e.g., upgrade, move)
Contracting Activation/fulfillment
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although many problems remained unsolved or the
solutions were workarounds, it was decided to execute
a very rapid ramp up. In effect, in cases 1 and 2, the
service was launched in beta. In case 3, management
decided not to launch in beta and felt that all prob-
lems had been addressed. However, only the upstream
FIGURE 2
Case 1 Timeline [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
FIGURE 3
Case 2 Timeline [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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service supply chain had been tested, not the down-
stream activities.
Ramp up Escalation. In all three cases, sales effort
was increased dramatically. The demand for all three
services was high, and the sales teams were successful
in meeting their aggressive sales targets. In cases 1 and
2, despite testing, unanticipated problems occurred
during scale-up, delaying activations and leading to a
huge increase in the order backlog (see Figure 3). In
case 1, the delay in acquiring and deploying resources
to address customer problems led to a rapid growth
in complaints (see Figure 2). In all three cases, various
efforts were made during this period to resolve prob-
lems and ensure that activations and problem-free use
were back on track.
ETEL’s management was aware of the potential pit-
falls of ramping up too quickly and the importance of
building an effective cross-functional sales and opera-
tions planning process (Oliva & Watson, 2011). They
sought to learn from both ongoing and previous
failed ramp ups, to avoid repeating earlier mistakes.
However, despite the steps taken to preempt such
issues, all three ramp ups were problematic, raising
the question of how effective the learning was from
case to case. We next explore this in the context of
two important decisions, when to ramp up and how
fast to scale up the service.
Ramp up Decisions
Prelaunch. Given the competitive pressure for early
launch and rapid ramp up in combination with
uncertainty over technical issues, deciding when and
how aggressively to ramp up is crucial. In cases 1 and
2, the decision was made to ramp up early, in particu-
lar launching took place before beta testing was com-
plete. This is consistent with previous research
(Zomerdijk & Voss, 2011) indicating that this is com-
mon when there are strong market pressures and fully
testing a service before launch may be difficult and
slow. The greater the pressure to get to market before
competitors, the greater the likelihood that decisions
will be made to ramp up before the firm is ready to
do so—increasing the risk of order fallout and result-
ing cycles of delay, backlog, and productivity prob-
lems. There was a clearly understood risk that early
ramp up could lead to problems, despite this the
company ramped up early assuming that these prob-
lems would be addressed. Ramp up escalation was
driven by commercial pressure, which could have
blinded marketing to the reality of the ramp up prob-
lems. In cases 2 and 3, although the activation rates
increased slowly, no management action was taken to
reduce the pressure on sales. This may have been due
in part to the lack of visibility of both activation rates
and backlogs. These decisions could also be explained
FIGURE 4
Case 3 Timeline [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Order backlog (scale 1:4)
Contracted er week
Ac vated per week
Cancella ons per week
ti
ti
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75
p
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as a result of the planning fallacy (Buehler, Griffin &
Ross, 1994), the tendency to optimistically plan pro-
ject timescales and resources and to overlook project
risks. This is one manifestation of the optimism bias:
a cognitive bias leading people to think they are more
likely to succeed, or are less at risk of failure or of
experiencing a negative event, than they really are.
“Planners tend to overestimate the probability of the
successful completion of a project and underestimate
the probability of negative events, overspends, and
setbacks. Moreover, this occurs even when knowing
that the majority of similar projects have over-run”
(Behavioural Insights, 2017, p. 5). A service such as
this draws on the resources of diverse subcontractors,
including internal suppliers (Sampson & Spring,
2012). Thus, the decision on when to ramp up should
also address availability of resources and the readiness
of the supply chain. The data from cases 1 and 2 indi-
cate that this was inadequate and a contributor to
ramping up too early.
Ramping up early led to predictable negative out-
comes. Technical or design problems occurred during
ramp up and post-ramp up use. When problems occur
in use that cannot be dealt with easily, resolving the
ensuing phenomenon of “order fallout,” discussed
earlier, often requires substantial human resources. In
digital services, this can lead to a cycle of unexpected
and sharp workload increases in the problem-solving
and customer-handling areas (Akkermans & Vos,
2003). This was evident in the negative outcomes; for
example, dealing with the problems in case 1 led to a
major workload increase in both problem- and
complaint-handling, leading to further delays and
backlogs.
Postlaunch. A second key decision is the speed of
ramp up. In all three cases, consistent with previous
research (Mass & Berkson, 1995), our data indicated
that the rapid ramp up caused problems. The speed of
ramp up is linked to scalability. Two factors that can
limit scalability are the non-IT elements of the service
and the complexity of the service (Boyer et al., 2001;
Hallowell, 2001), these were evident in all three cases,
thus limiting the scaling of the services.
We observed that scalability encompassed two areas:
scalability of the supply chain and scalability of the
service. Problems with the scalability of the supply
chain were most apparent in case 2, where the rapid
ramp up required scaling up of capacity in multiple
locations. All cases illustrated problems with the scala-
bility of the service. In case 1, the initial version of
the service was designed for simple-use contexts, and
it did not scale up well for more complex uses. The
service still being in beta at the start of the ramp up
compounded the scaling problems. This was also a
problem in case 2, where the immaturity of the soft-
ware led to increasingly more IT workarounds. In case
3, the service was not ramped up until the company
was confident that it was working well. However, this
testing was limited to the upstream order-handling.
Downstream, a multitude of smaller orders was all
interdependently executed by a wide variety of inde-
pendent internal and outsourced units. As a result, the
service soon encountered a multitude of technical
problems and delays.
In all three cases, management, despite knowing in
advance about the risks of ramping up too fast,
decided to ramp up early and to ramp up very
rapidly. This raises the question of: Why? The plan-
ning fallacy (Buehler et al., 1994) is one explanation
of management’s behavior. They may also have
ramped up too quickly because of a lack of under-
standing of the constraints of scalability. Despite there
being a spectrum of scalability, from high to low
(Boyer et al., 2001), their behavior is consistent with
assuming that the scalability is much higher that
should be expected from the service context (Hallow-
ell, 2001). This was compounded by a failure to rec-
ognize the complexity of the service supply chain—
indeed, as one senior manager at ETEL stated, “We
have no supply chain.”
We conclude that unrealistic expectations of scalabil-
ity due to the planning fallacy and a lack of attention
to and understanding of the scalability of both the
service and the supply chain contributed significantly
to decisions to accelerate ramp up speed, leading to
the experienced ramp up problems.
Capacity Management
The operations management team were set a target
of 100 percent utilization of all resources. In a volatile
context, a conservative approach to setting capacity
levels can lead to a lack of flexibility in dealing with
extra capacity demands, limiting rapid response capa-
bility. For example, in case 1, the problems led to a
quadrupling of capacity in the call centers along with
300 additional installation technicians and a new
team to deal with complex complaints individually.
These resources took considerable time to be
deployed.
Capacity problems persisted throughout the ramp
ups. In case 2, both the JV partner and the pool of
engineers reported that they would be unable to deli-
ver sufficient manpower to meet the demand plan. By
the end of the beta phase, in case 2, the fiber manage-
ment team proposed that they should execute a “com-
mercial emergency brake” as there was no evidence
that the supply network could handle the required
numbers. In response to their statement that “it will be
impossible to meet this deadline given the current
resources,” management replied, “Make it possible.”
Marketing wrongly assumed that the service supply
chain could cope with a rapid ramp up (up to 160
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times the volume) and that capacity build-up would
not be an issue: “We then believed the network would go
live very quickly” (Marketing manager, case 2). In cases
2 and 3, the complexity of the service supply chain
was underestimated, leading to difficulties in imple-
menting robust demand and capacity systems before
full ramp up. Case 2 involved a complex service,
requiring many steps to be taken in harmony by mul-
tiple independent parties in synchronizing activities as
diverse as digging to place cables and installing soft-
ware upgrades for communication with new equip-
ment. New reporting methods also had to be
implemented, making it problematic to assess actual
delivery performance for the current pool of orders,
and, as a result, the service supply chain lacked trans-
parency.
Ramp down
Corrective efforts were insufficient to reduce the
backlogs or levels of customer problems in the short
term. In case 1, there was major public discontent; in
cases 2 and 3, management came to realize that the
backlog of contracted customers waiting to be acti-
vated had become excessive, lead times were too long,
and quality problems and complaints were at unac-
ceptably high levels. In all three cases, management
drastically curtailed the order intake, and in case 3,
they even canceled a large part of the backlog (Fig-
ure 4). Following ramp downs, management focused
on solving the main service problems to ready the
company for renewed ramp ups, which were more
cautious and conservative. An important but neglected
decision area is whether, when, and how to ramp
down. We examine the empirical data to explore why
they occurred, why and when decisions to ramp down
were made, and how they were handled.
The antecedents of the ramp downs arose from the
factors described in the previous section: ramping up
while still in beta, ramping up very fast, and failing to
manage the scaling of the service and the supply
chain. These led to problems that needed to be
addressed, and the longer such problems went
unsolved, the greater the probability that there would
be a need for a major ramp down. In all the cases,
there was failure to fully resolve the problems quickly.
We observe a number of possible reasons for this.
First, as in case 1, when problems did occur, there
were insufficient resources to address them as they
occurred, and there was a time lag in mobilizing suffi-
cient resources. Second, time pressure meant that
problems were addressed through a range of fixes,
technical compromises, and workarounds “We con-
tinue to connect small batches of customer and commercial
testing to facilitate learning in operations and support a
quick ramp up when the supply chain is fully ready”
(Management presentation, case 2). In case 2,
workarounds were already being used in the alpha
phase: “What doesn’t work will be solved with work-
arounds” (Management team presentation, case 2). Just
prior to the ramp down, the company was managing
about 30 workarounds, ranging from simple to com-
plex, costly, and time-consuming solutions. Gross
(2014) observed in product launches where unex-
pected problems occur, these need to be addressed as
soon as they arise, leading to improvisational behav-
ior, workarounds. This decreases both the launch per-
formance and financial performance, and thus,
improvisation should be avoided during new product
development as well as during the launch. He also
argued that this could be a source of valuable learning
in regard to new problems and their solutions. There
is thus a trade-off between solving problems perma-
nently, which may slow down ramp ups, or hoping
that workarounds will lead to problems being fully
addressed before there is market damage and poten-
tially ramp down.
The above led to a situation where problems could
likely not be resolved rapidly and where there would
be negative customer impact. However, the time taken
to decide to ramp down seemed to be slow, for case 1
it was 32 weeks (see Table 1), though faster subse-
quent reactions indicate that learning may have taken
place. Cases 1 and 2 in particular indicate that there
were delays in making the ramp down decision. We
see evidence of a number of possible causes for this.
First is lack of, or lack of visibility of, appropriate data
to indicate that there were serious current or potential
problems. In cases 1 and 2 in particular, although
problems were evident at an early stage to those deliv-
ering the ramp up, the problems and the signals that
there were problems, such as low levels of activation,
high levels of backlog and customer complaints, were
not necessarily reaching those with decision-making
powers concerning ramp up and ramp down. For
example, in case 1, senior management was celebrat-
ing record sales at the point when customer com-
plaints were peaking.
Why were the ramp downs needed? Studies on pro-
duct recall indicate that voluntary recalls take place
when there are potentially significant costs of not
recalling—societal costs, direct costs, and indirect costs
(Hora et al., 2011). In none of the cases were there
societal costs, but failure to ramp down may already
have led to potentially significant direct costs and loss
of revenue, and indirect costs, such as brand image
and erosion of market value. There were already sig-
nificant negative impacts on the customers and hence
implications for profit and reputation, and these
would have got worse if action were not taken. In case
1, failures in activation led to a massive rise in cus-
tomer complaints. In cases 2 and 3, there were major
increases in customer backlogs, which in turn led to
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customer complaints and in case 3 to order cancela-
tions by both customers and ETEL. The need for a
ramp down occurred when the negative outcomes
would be compounded by continued delivery or roll-
out of the service.
What triggered the decision to ramp down? It is
interesting to note that in all three cases ramp downs
were not triggered by the initial recognition that there
were potentially difficult-to-address problems,
although there was ample evidence of such problems
occurring and the growth of unplanned backlogs.
While these may have raised managerial awareness, it
would seem that the decision to ramp down was
made only after customer-based feedback. This
included increasing customer complaints, order cance-
lations, and, in case 1, negative social media and tele-
vision coverage. For example, in case 1, customer
problems featured in several programs on national
TV, prompting the CEO to state, “We became victims of
our own success.” If decisions had been made earlier to
slow or halt ramp up to allow the issues at hand to
be addressed more effectively, the longer-term ramp
ups may have been more successful.
To summarize, our observations indicate that there
are similarities between service ramp downs and pro-
duct recall. Whether and when to recall a product is
one of the most important, yet complex decisions that
an operations manager may face (Ball et al., 2018).
Recalls and ramp downs are needed when a point is
reached where continued ramp up of the service or
use of the product will lead to negative outcomes.
There is concern about the time it takes for product
recalls to happen, which parallels our case data indi-
cating that the services should have been ramped
down earlier. We observe that launching in beta and
ramping up rapidly contribute to the problems that
trigger the subsequent need to ramp down. This was
compounded by the time needed to put in place the
resources to deal with the problems and improvisa-
tional problem-solving. Moreover, we observe a num-
ber of factors that contributed to delaying the
decision to ramp down, including optimism bias and
lack of visibility of key indicators, such as backlogs
and customer complaints, as well as pressure from
financial incentives. After these aggressive launches
under technical uncertainties, it is unlikely that the
ramp downs could have been avoided. However,
through more thorough problem-solving, better data
visibility, and rapid decision-making there could have
been gentler and earlier ramp downs, which could
have led to reduced costs to the company.
Learning and Ramp downs
It could be argued that if the company had learned
from the problems in each case, then the problems
that led to ramp down subsequent cases may not
have occurred. Learning is important in ramp ups
(Pisano, 1996), and the longitudinal study gave us
the opportunity to examine the learning from case to
case. The first opportunity for learning from problems
was the ramp up for case 1, which led to develop-
ment of improved sales and order planning systems.
However, no connection seems to have been made
between launching early and technical problems in
the installation, resulting in the early launch in case
2. By case 3, all these issues had been recognized and
steps are taken to address them. Despite this learning,
a new set of problems arose from scaling up the ser-
vice. The workshops held during the ramp ups were
specifically designed for learning (Vennix, 1996) and
would have provided management with the opportu-
nity to debate and learn from failure (Canon &
Edmonson, 2005); moreover, the involvement of the
researchers would have resulted in greater learning
than would otherwise have taken place. However, in
case 2, it seems that not all this learning was taken
on board. This may have been due to the financial
and market pressures from senior management as
well as optimism bias. In contrast, the learning was
taken on board for case 3. Although learning from
failure is an obvious thing for an organization to do,
there is evidence that it is difficult and often does not
occur. A study of a European telecom organization
comparable to our case concluded that the company
“learned surprisingly little from the failures we inves-
tigated. Managers generally explained away large fail-
ures on the basis of general societal trends or the
involvement of outsiders” (Baumard & Starbuck,
2005, p. 294). To learn from failure or major prob-
lems, companies must first learn to identify failure,
not just large-scale, but especially the small failures,
and then use analysis to capture the lessons (Canon
& Edmonson, 2005). We conclude that in ramp ups,
identifying and learning from problems are important
for improving the ramp up process but that there are
barriers to this process. In addition, even when there
has been valuable learning, it must be recognized that
new problems can arise.
Modeling the Dynamics
So far, we have treated the decisions to ramp up or
to ramp down as separate decisions. They take place
at different moments in time, but are they two very
different decisions? They are taken by the same peo-
ple, both in sales and in operations, and are based on
the same performance indicators. Only the direction
of the decisions is completely opposite for ramp ups
and ramp downs. A system dynamics analysis can
deepen our understanding of these decisions. In all
the cases, interaction between operations and market-
ing/sales functions was both essential and problemati-
cal. In each case, based on the observed behavior,
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system dynamics models were developed. Based on
these, to increase our understanding of the dynamics
of the ramp up and ramp down processes, a generic
model was developed that represents how the actions
of the sales and operations functions in the service
supply chain were linked, both causally and over time
(see Figure 5).
In system dynamics, behavior over time is seen as
the result of the dynamic interactions of two types of
feedback loops: balancing loops that steer the system
toward a certain goal or desired behavior and rein-
forcing feedback loops that steer the system toward a
path of exponential growth or decline. The net result
of all feedback loops determines the actual behavior
of the system. Our model is comprised of three inter-
acting feedback loops—two balancing (B) and one
reinforcing (R). Examining the underlying causal
structure that generates the complex dynamics
observed, it is apparent that both ramp ups and ramp
down decisions are the consequences of the same bal-
ancing loops that overshoot.
The first balancing loop is in sales, whose aim is to
set the target sales rate as high as possible without
compromising service delivery performance. The sales
rate is adjusted based on performance data. However,
there are lags in assessing current delivery perfor-
mance as it takes time for orders to travel through the
service supply chain and for information about deliv-
ery delays, fallout rates, and so on to travel back to
sales and to confirm with sufficient certainty that the
perceived performance is a trend and not just a ran-
dom signal. Finally, there are implementation delays
in translating the new understanding into revised poli-
cies—maintaining, increasing, or reducing the level of
sales (Sterman, 2000). It is these delays that lead to
an overshoot.
The second balancing loop is in operations, where
the objective is to optimize capacity utilization
without compromising delivery performance. As in
sales, acquiring and processing the required informa-
tion are subject to several delays. For example, it can
be difficult to determine how much capacity is
required for a given volume of incoming orders. As
many processes are digital, significant capacity may be
required for dealing with problems and rework, but
the extent of the rework depends on the quality of the
orders rather than their volume (Akkermans & Vos,
2003). Thus, it takes time to establish when corrective
action is needed; the corrective action (hiring and
training extra staff) also takes time, as does evaluating
the adequacy of that corrective action. Again, these
delays can lead to an overshoot. Between these two
balancing loops, a third, but reinforcing loop is con-
cerned with rework. Fallout leads to rework, which
increases workload to address the problems. How well
the service performs will be determined by this rework
cycle (Oliva & Sterman, 2001).
“It is important to understand the relationship
between operational and marketing processes and out-
comes because, logically, operational success is an
essential precondition to market success” (Tatikonda &
Montoya-Weiss, 2001, p. 152). Our empirical data
indicate opposing decision biases in marketing and
operations. Decision biases are systematic deviations in
decision-making (Bendoly, Croson & Goncalves,
2010). In operations, the observed policy of maximiz-
ing rather than optimizing capacity utilization in the
context of high uncertainty and the high market cost of
failing to fulfill customer needs can be viewed as deci-
sion bias. In marketing, performance measurement-dri-
ven pressure for rapid growth, prompting a willingness
to ignore ongoing technical problems and capacity
considerations in favor of ambitious ramp ups, can
also be viewed as decision bias. These decision biases
thus reflect a misalignment between targets. Figure 5
indicates these biases in targets will lead to higher sales
FIGURE 5
Service Ramp ups and Ramp downs—Three Interconnected Feedback Loops [Color figure can be viewed at wile
yonlinelibrary.com]
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rates and lower capacity availability than is needed,
which in turn will lead to higher backlogs. As the
model predicts, establishing when action is needed,
taking corrective action, and assessing the adequacy of
actions taken all took time, creating a strong amplifica-
tion of the issues in both functions. Delays and a lack
of information made addressing this more difficult. In
addition, for both the sales and operations feedback
loops, the rework cycle loop further complicated
decisions and performance. Contributing to this were
temporary fixes and workarounds for problems com-
pounded the need for capacity to solve the problems.
This can (and did) exhibit a tipping point, where
increasingly more orders can be processed relatively
smoothly until a capacity threshold is passed. At that
point, a vicious cycle was triggered, in which more
rework led to higher workloads, leading to more errors
and more temporary fixes, which led to further rework.
In less extreme ramp ups, or with less delay, deci-
sions could be made to reduce sales targets. However,
in all three cases here it was too late, and the only
possible decision was to ramp down. Out-of-control
feedback loops forced the company to ramp down to
regain control of the process.
Because ramp ups require cross-functional coordina-
tion and good visibility of capacity and backlogs
(Oliva & Watson, 2011), the more complex the ser-
vice, the more important these become and the more
difficult they are to put in place. This was a major
problem in case 2, and it proved problematic in the
other cases, indicating that poor systems and lack of
visibility can compound ramp up problems. Effective
systems can help build synergies between marketing
and operations. Such synergies are valuable when
built on complementary resources (Harrison, Hitt,
Hoskisson & Ireland, 2001).
We conclude that the behavior of the three ramp ups
and the consequent ramp downs can be understood
from a system dynamics perspective. In particular, the
system dynamics model shown in Figure 5 indicates
the conditions under which ramp up overshoots will
occur, ramp downs will occur, and the need to align
target sales rates and target capacity utilization. We
argue that the capacity strategy should be consistent
with the complexity of the service and its supply chain
and the technical uncertainty associated with the new
service. It seems realistic to expect that many new ser-
vices will be launched in beta, and capacity and
resource decisions should take account of this. Finally,
the model indicates that delays have a major impact on
the capacity to deal with misalignments and problems.
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this research is to explore ramp ups
in the context of digital services, with a focus on the
understudied area of ramp downs. It is based on three
cases in a narrow context, but from our analysis, we
set out a more general base for understanding service
ramp ups and ramp downs.
Ramp up
Deploying new services rapidly is increasingly
important for competitiveness (Qiang, Voss & Zhao,
2018); however, extant research shows that too rapid
growth leads to negative outcomes (Sterman et al.,
2007). Our research builds on this by exploring rapid
growth in digital services and the precursors of and
behavioral contributors to ramp up problems. Service
ramp ups can be understood in two parts—pre- and
postlaunch.
Prelaunch. Service ramp ups typically take place
immediately after the NSD process. Because the ser-
vice may be difficult to fully test before launch and
due to competitive pressure, services may be ramped
up early, before they are fully developed—launching
in beta. However, launching services that are not fully
developed and/or tested can negatively influence the
ramp up process and outcomes (Mass & Berkson,
1995). Thus, the key decision on when to ramp up
will require explicit attention to trade-offs: launching
too late—which may lead to loss of market share or
first-mover advantage—and launching too early—
which risks service failure. The decision to ramp up
should also address whether all the resources needed,
not just those directly associated with the service, but
across the whole supply chain, are in place.
Postlaunch. Service ramp ups, unlike products, take
place in the field. Thus, any problems with the service
or its delivery will manifest themselves to customers.
The speed of ramp up is a central issue. Although ser-
vice systems do not necessarily ramp up rapidly, a
context of high competitive pressures and the growing
digitization of services can lead to planning ramp ups
that are an order of magnitude faster than product
ramp ups.
We identify in our cases a number of factors leading
to ramping up too soon and/or too fast, though they
may not be present in all service ramp ups. As with
projects, pressure to ramp up soon and rapidly accen-
tuates the risk of the planning fallacy (Buehler et al.,
1994)—that is, planning optimistically and overlook-
ing project risks. The risks associated with early ramp
up include unforeseen technical problems, and lack of
capacity and capability in the service delivery system.
The risks associated with rapid ramp up can include
growing faster than scalability constraints, failure to
resolve technical and service design problems quickly,
and an inability to rapidly resource problem-solving
when needed (Morrison, 2015).
We observed in our cases a neglect and possible lack
of understanding of scalability. Services’ scalability can
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range from low to high (Boyer et al., 2001), and there
are risks that this scalability can be assumed to be
higher than it actually is. There is often an assump-
tion that digital services can scale rapidly even when
there are constraining factors (Hallowell, 2001). These
issues may be compounded by lack of recognition of
the full service supply chain. In addition, as the nat-
ure of the service may change over time, the scalabil-
ity of the service as well as the supply chain must be
considered.
How fast to ramp up is a decision to be taken at
launch and involves decisions by marketing on sales
rates and operations on capacities. These decisions
also need reviewing regularly during ramp up. This
requires transparency and appropriate data on capaci-
ties, backlogs, and order problems. As ramp ups take
place in the field, they involve both sales/marketing
and operations functions when making decisions
about resources, ramp up speed, and ramp down.
Tang (2010) contends that marketing and operations
can coexist in harmony within a firm when the mar-
ket condition is stable. However, he argues that when
developing and launching new products and services
quickly, operations groups may find it challenging to
meet marketing’s expectations because production
cannot be changed quickly. Thus, in rapid ramp ups
co-operations between marketing and operations can
be expected to be challenging. Although they may
have been accentuated here, we contend that there is
a general potential for functional misalignments to
occur in the context of rapid service ramp ups. First,
there may be differences in team culture. Second, per-
formance measures for operations and marketing may
be not aligned. For example, we observed an aggres-
sive sales policy and a conservative capacity policy in
our cases. In a service ramp up where capacity is
uncertain, a potential dilemma for operations man-
agers is whether to aim high and potentially incur
cost penalties or adopt a conservative approach and
risk building up insufficient capacity. These misalign-
ments derive in part from the specific organization,
but they also reflect the broader cultures associated
with marketing, operations, and other functional spe-
cialisms, and as such, they are perhaps less easily
changed. In ramp ups, functional decision biases can
lead to misalignment, worsening cycles of delay, and
backlogs. Thus, particularly in rapid ramp ups, there
is a need for firms to manage potential conflict
between marketing and operations. Our system
dynamics model indicates how this conflict can lead
to escalating feedback loops and failure to react effec-
tively to problems. Out-of-control feedback loops lead
to conditions requiring ramp down.
Ramp ups can be a common process in service
firms, so learning is needed to avoid mistakes and
improve processes (Pisano, 1996). Learning in
complex, dynamic systems with significant feedback
delays and accumulations in contexts such as this are
problematic (Bendoly et al., 2010). As projects get
more complicated, managers stop learning from their
experience and fall into an “experience trap” using
simplified heuristics developed from earlier, simpler
contexts (Sengupta, Abdel-Habid & van Wassenhove,
2008). Hall and Johnson-Hall (2017) argue that in
product recall, the learning derived from failures can
reduce the potential for future recalls. We would
expect a similar pattern in ramp downs.
Ramp down
A key finding from this research was the impor-
tance and nature of ramp downs. In ramp ups, prob-
lems are likely to occur, particularly if launched in
beta and with rapid ramp ups. Delays or failure to
resolve problems leads to the possibility of the need
to ramp down, cutting back or even stopping sales
and delivery of the service and/or canceling existing
orders. We have learned four things about ramp
downs.
The Conditions Triggering the Need for a Ramp
Down and Their Precursors. There are parallels
between the processes of service ramp down and pro-
duct recall. The conditions for both are when there
are potentially significant costs arising from not ramp-
ing down or recalling (Hora et al., 2011). In services,
these are direct costs, loss of revenue, and indirect
costs, such as impact on brand image and market
value. We identified multiple precursors of the need
to ramp down. In addition to those that influence
recalls, such as operational issues and actions that
influence the quality of the product (Wowak & Boone,
2015), there are those distinctive to service ramp
downs. We observed many in our research: services
launched in beta, leading to design problems remain-
ing to be solved during ramp up; having inadequate
resources to address problems, leading to delays in
acquiring resources and addressing problems (Mor-
rison, 2015); ramping up with inadequate attention
to scaling the supply chain, leading to logistics and
delivery problems; inadequate planning for the nature
and scope of the service, which can lead to delays in
service delivery; and finally solving problems by the
use of improvisational means, such as workarounds,
which may delay real problem-solving (Gross, 2014).
Other precursors are possible; for example, Qiang
et al. (2018) report a case where too late a ramp up
led to ramp down as the service was obsolete by the
time it was deployed.
Delay is a Key Issue in Ramping Down. Delays are
an important concern in both product recalls (Wowak
& Boone, 2015) and service ramp downs. However, if
problems are identified and addressed rapidly, they
may not lead to the need to ramp down or the degree
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of ramping down could be less severe. In our study,
the time from launch to ramp down was in the range
of 11–32 weeks (Table 1). Hora et al. (2011) and Ni
and Huang (2017) report substantial concern about
delays in product recall decisions; for example, in a
product recall of toys, the average time to recall ran-
ged from 463 to 869 days and in automakers from
5.78 to 16.29 months. This substantial difference
between products and services could be due to prod-
ucts being fully tested prior to launch and further
problems only being identified after substantial use,
while for digital services, a fast ramp up would lead
to problems being identified much more rapidly. We
observed that in rapid ramp ups, delays in addressing
problems can result in a tipping point where a cycle
of higher workloads leads to more errors and more
temporary fixes, leading to further problems. This in
turn has implications for capacity strategy in digital
services, since the bulk of the human capacity
required is often rework, depending on the quality of
orders, more than their quantity (Akkermans & Voss,
2013).
Causes of Ramp down Delay. In rapid ramp ups,
delays in information and decision-making can seri-
ously delay adjustments in ramp ups and decisions to
ramp down. The model in Figure 5 indicates that cor-
rective action will only be taken once the function rec-
ognizes a performance problem. In all cases,
considerable time elapsed before sales grasped what
was happening in the field and could decide what to
do. Rapid response requires both capturing the appro-
priate information, for example, backlogs and com-
plaints, and to have systems for capturing it early.
Today, monitoring social media is increasingly effec-
tive for rapid forewarning of problems.
Management behavior can be a cause of delays.
Optimism bias may lead to assumptions that prob-
lems can be solved rapidly and permanently and thus
delaying decision-making. Consistent with outcomes
observed in the cases, Meyer (2014) found that in-
project optimism bias contributed significantly to
decision makers’ motivation to continue with a failing
project. Moreover, ramping down may not be an easy
decision to make. First, with aggressive target-setting
linked to sales (as in this case), where marketing and
sales personnel are financially incentivized, a ramp
down can have a negative financial effect at the per-
sonal level. Second, there is significant institutional
investment in a major ramp up, and ramp down
entails a loss of face, internally and potentially exter-
nally. Face-saving is associated with behavior that pro-
tects an individual’s self-esteem and that of others
(Scheff, 1988). An inability to meet the standards of
social norms or values results in a loss of face for the
individual (Young, 2014). These factors may bias
organizations toward delaying ramp down decisions.
Mitigating Ramp up Problems. A further issue iden-
tified in product recalls is mitigation approaches
(Wowak & Boone, 2015). While we did not collect
data on this, there is a substantial field of study on
mitigation approaches in services—service recovery.
There are choices in service recovery including
whether apologies should be pro-active or reactive
and whether and where recompense should be given.
The effectiveness and choices of service recovery strate-
gies are contingent on context (Mattila, 2001); thus,
there is a need for exploring these in the context of
ramp downs.
Our research argues for extension of the scope of
theories of NSD. Extant research sees the process as
being completed prior to ramp up: “the process of
devising a new or improved service, from idea or con-
cept generation to market launch” (Biemans, Griffin &
Moenaert, 2016; p. 2). Menor et al. (2002) see the
endpoint of NSD as a full launch. Consequently, that
ramp up takes place at the end of the NSD process
has either been ignored or seen as nonproblematic.
Successful exploitation of service innovations requires
attention to their deployment (Qiang et al., 2018).
We argue that theories of service innovation and NSD
should be extended to include the processes of
deployment and ramping up.
The rapidly changing business environment raises
the question, what are the future implications of this
research? Technology evolution has increased the
complexity of the service context by multiplying the
ways customers can interact with other customers and
different service providers, leading to complex service
networks (Karmarkar, Kim & Rhim, 2015; Patricio,
Gustafsson & Fisk, 2018). We contend that these
trends will accentuate the issues that we have identi-
fied in service ramp ups. However, increasing learning
and awareness of the need to manage service supply
chains and experience in ramping up in digital ser-
vices may counter this.
CONCLUSIONS
This research contributes to our understanding of
service ramp ups and ramp downs. First, it proposes
both similarities and differences between service and
product ramp ups. Second, it elaborates a sequential
model of the service ramp up process and identifies
and explores key decisions, problems, and their
causes. A distinctive contribution is the identification
and exploration of the ramp down phenomenon. We
identify reasons for the need to ramp down, their
antecedents and in particular identify delays as a key
issue and explore their potential causes.
The research has limitations. First, the empirical data
were collected in one company and technical context,
which limits the generalizability of the results. Other
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contexts may exhibit different or additional issues and
behaviors. Second, such cases risk bias by the
researcher and need validation in different contexts.
Third, some of the issues identified ex post were
strongly related to management behavior and Ball
et al. (2018) call for research into behavioral aspects
of the decision to recall. More in-depth methods are
needed to build on these insights, such as whether
company-level behavior would influence our findings.
The research was conducted in the context of digital
services; thus, a question arises as to its wider general-
izability to nondigital service contexts. At first glance,
the problems in the three cases could be viewed sim-
ply as examples of bad management. However, we
argue that, although the observed problems may be
worse than in many ramp ups, they reflect the multi-
ple potential causes of service ramp up and ramp
down problems.
Our findings provide implications for practice. To
avoid falling into ramp up traps, ideally, ramping up
should occur only after successful testing; however,
the reality of competitive pressure and technical
understanding means that many organizations will
opt to launch in beta. They must manage the balance
between ensuring the product is right, the market
pressures to launch quickly, and investment in agile
capacity to deal with potential technical issues. They
require effective sales and operations planning systems
to ensure transparency and minimize information
delays as well as to coordinate planning in both func-
tions. To avoid delayed ramp down decisions, compa-
nies need early warning signals and a fast and
effective process to ramp down in a timely, controlled
manner when required.
Managers must understand the context of their ser-
vice and how it will influence scalability and constrain
ramp up speed; particularly in digital services, they
should be wary of assumptions of “infinite scalabil-
ity.” These are challenges for many organizations,
owing to the optimism and cognitive biases that affect
decision-making and the technical and market uncer-
tainty inherent in such ramp ups.
With the growth of services in a highly competitive
environment, implementing ramp ups effectively and
avoiding costly ramp downs will be increasingly
important for long-term success. Promising directions
for further research include exploring the interaction
of the factors and decisions associated with service
ramp ups, and extending research to other empirical
settings to understand how service ramp ups and
ramp downs vary with context. The use of system
dynamics models and simulations can contribute to
this. There is scope for examining the learning pro-
cesses, behavioral aspects, the decision biases, and
assumptions that inform the management of service
ramp ups and ramp downs.
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APPENDIX
IN-CASE RESULTS
To address RQ2 and RQ3, we examine the individ-
ual ramp ups in more detail.
Case 1: Consumer Voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP).
At the outset, management held the view that a cau-
tious rollout should be planned. Initially, no advance
orders were taken. Once the service was publicly
launched, there were ten times the expected orders,
leading to a high level of outstanding orders early in
the process. After some delay, the supply network was
January 2019
Ramp Up and Ramp Down Dynamics
19
able to adapt to the higher volume, and installations
kept pace with the still moderate level of sales. How-
ever, there were many technical problems during this
period—for example, customers would lose the use of
their previous service before the new one had been
installed, and there were complaints about intermit-
tent service.
Customer groups were segmented by level of techni-
cal complexity; to begin, marketing focused only on
the easy customer segments. Around week 20, this
approach was abandoned, and a major ramp up
began (see Figure 2). The number of customers with
connection problems grew rapidly, with an ever-
increasing number of complaints as more customers
contacted the helpdesk. At the same time, the com-
pany became increasingly worried about its fulfillment
capability, leading eventually to the recruitment of
300 extra technicians to help customers with home
installations. In addition, an extra team was formed
to deal with complex complaints on an individual
basis. A new installation package was developed that
was easier for customers to use. In week 42, as help-
desk calls peaked, the top management team broke
out the Champagne to celebrate record sales. Soon
afterward, the problems were publicized on TV and
social media, and by week 60, both complaints and
negative media coverage had peaked. Sales were scaled
down to allow existing consumer problems to be
effectively addressed, and by week 65, these were run-
ning at pre-ramp up levels. Once sales had been
ramped down, there was a period of consolidation to
allow technical problems to be fully resolved before
gradual recovery in activation.
Case 2: Fiber-based broadband services. Reflecting on
the problems in case 1, the management team
decided to create a more thorough sales and opera-
tions planning process to regulate the speed of roll-
out, taking account of both central capacity and local
constraints such as a shortage of engineers. The service
was initially tested on a number of friendly users and
then in a first local pilot. The explicit strategy was to
increase sales, but slowly and with a degree of
restraint. However, even in the early stages, there were
both pressures for and expectations of rapid ramp up
once the initial technical problems had been
addressed:
We started selling fiber even though the supply network
was not finished. We cannot wait for the supply network
to function. We then believed the supply network would
go live very quickly. (Case 2, Marketing manager)
In both alpha and beta phases, orders were being
taken ahead of ramp up. During beta, all services
(Internet, TV, and Voice) worked, but there were still
activation problems. Problem-solving and learning
continued, with increasing use of workarounds for
cases that had not been solved by software releases.
Despite growing evidence of technical delays, market-
ing continued to contract new customers. At the same
time, the pressure to deliver ambitious ramp up goals
remained and even intensified. As shown in Figure 3,
orders contracted remained steady during the first
15 weeks, but the level of activated orders remained
very low, causing the backlog to escalate rapidly.
Around week 15, the ramp up accelerated, and sales
efforts were substantially increased.
There is an aggressive conversion campaign for the
existing customer base. We have targets for sales and
cost per order, and it is our job to sell as many orders
as possible against the lowest cost—that’s our mission.
(Case 2, Fiber director)
While the weekly rate of contracted customers
increased strongly, customer activation rates continued
to lag considerably behind. Technical problems per-
sisted, and capacity issues continued to emerge. By week
35, management had realized that the backlog of cus-
tomers waiting to be activated had become too large,
lead times were too long, and levels of quality problems
and complaints were too high. The decision was made
to scale back drastically on sales, and order intake was
stopped for all but one customer group. Subsequently,
technical in-service problems were stabilized, and a
steadier and more effective ramp up followed.
Case 3: Business VOIP. Following consumer VOIP,
the company launched a business VOIP service. Man-
agement had learned from the problems with preced-
ing launches that a cautious rollout should be
planned. Learning from cases 1 and 2, there was an
extended initial (alpha) testing period with 100
friendly users (see Figure 4). This extended testing
identified numerous flaws in the IT system, and every
order required manual rework, which resulted in the
installation of a new IT system. This was followed by
a beta evaluation of service robustness. Once the ini-
tial technical problems had been addressed, advance
orders again began to be taken, allowing a small back-
log to develop. In week 40, a very ambitious ramp up
was launched in full.
Estimates for the ramp up vary between 60 to 160
times the current volume through the service supply
chain. Historically, such a steep ramp up is not uncom-
mon. (Case 3, External consultant)
However, although the initial problems had been
solved by means of manual fixes and workarounds,
these did not translate into high-order volumes. In
addition, problems surfaced in parts of the supply
chain that were not involved in the early careful test-
ing, such as external partners, billing, and technical
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operations. Having to execute workarounds for large
numbers of orders proved very difficult, in terms of
both resources required and ongoing fundamental
problems. As a result, the activation rate remained
very low, and within ten weeks, a massive backlog
had developed, leading in turn to a substantial rise in
order cancelations. In response, the sales effort was
drastically scaled down until these problems could be
resolved. One third of backlogged orders were can-
celed, and once the problems had been effectively
addressed, the launch continued with a more modest
ramp up.
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